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The purpose of the study is to analyze the ongoing ethnic tensions in the South Caucasus. The 
study compares the neighbouring Georgian-Ossetian conflict in South Ossetia and the Armenian-
Azerbaijani conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh  
It is considered, that Russia is manipulating ethnic conflicts in the neighbourhood as a 
strategic aspect of its regional policy. The purpose of the article below is to analyze the last two South 
Caucasus conflicts, where one claims that Russia is trying to repress the foreign aspirations of the 
‘’defeated’’ parties, Armenia and Georgia. 
 
Introduction 
The South Caucasus region has been one of the most desired destinations for ethnic conflict 
scholars for the past thirty years. Each conflict has become possible in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. However, the origins of the hostilities can be uncovered in the nineteenth century, the age 
of the Russian Empire's Caucasian expansion. The conflicts in South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh 
represent a direct continuation of the conflicts of the 1990s. Much has changed in these conflicts since the 
1990s. If decades ago, opposed peoples lived side by side in the same towns and villages, The 2008 and 
the recent 2020 conflicts have fully transformed into real, well-planned warfare between more or less 
professional armies.  
The West is attempting to accomplish a mediating role in the region. However, Russia is the 
crucial factor. Russia’s role in the development of these conflicts is central to our investigation. Hence, 
our focus is primarily on Russia's regional agenda.  
This paper attempts to seek the possible third-party purpose of Post-Soviet ethnic conflicts by 
comparing the two latest cases. The role of the Russian Federation in both conflicts allows us to attempt 
analyzing Russia’s strategy in these events. The study argues that Russia’s actions in the second wars in 
South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh are part of the regional strategies/purposes and serve to maintain 
effective control mechanisms over conflict participating countries (Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan).   
Since the crucial object of our study is to seek Russia’s impact on the transformation of the two 
very recent conflicts of the South Caucasus, the research question which has to be inquired is this: 
How do the Russian foreign policy priorities impact the ethnic conflicts of the South 
Caucasus?   
The study is qualitative and relies on the discussion of secondary materials, the methodology of 
the inquiry is based on the comparative analysis of similar cases. The South Ossetian separatism declares 
its intention to reach and develop a more sophisticated relationship with the North Ossetian Autonomous 
Republic of The Russian Federation. Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh aspire to ‘’unite’’ with Armenia. 
In this view, Russia may have less interest in the Armenian – Azerbaijani conflict because, unlike the 
South Ossetian war, the possible outcome of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute does not include the possible 
territorial expansion of the Russian Federation. However, there are other aspects, which can attract 
Russian interest towards the Armenian – Azerbaijani rivalry, the strategically important oil resources of 
Azerbaijan, with the potential to balance European dependence on Russian energy. 
In the comparative study of parallel conflicts, the strategy of Russia is the central object of 
analysis.  
The first chapter of the paper discusses the events of the 2008 August war. The second 
chapter recalls the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, outcomes and similarities of these conflicts are 
concluded and discussed in the context of Russia's geopolitical gains and losses. 
 
Conceptual outline 
 Carment and James have offered two opposing views, which are used to explain the conflicts that 
have arisen between different peoples/nations since the collapse of ethnically diverse states. This 
‘’collapse’’ can also be conceptualized as ‘’de confederation’’ (Carment and James 2000). The first view 
indicates that the collapse of ethnically diverse states (such as the ‘’de confederation’’ of The Soviet 
Union) causes the rebirth of ancient hatreds and ethnic antagonisms (Cohen 1992). With the dissolution of 
the centre of power, new power actors and institutions are built on these rivalries. The second view 
indicates that ethnic conflicts always spread with purpose rather than inevitability (Snyder 1993).  
 Azerbaijani - Armenian conflict was ''frozen'' for seven decades and had returned to the 
active phase upon the collapse of the USSR. Still, it is almost impossible to seek the real ‘’dissolution 
of power’’ or the rebirth of new power actors and institutions while Russian Federation has inherited 
The Soviet institutions and power remains in the region despite massive changes in the aftermath of 
The Soviet collapse. 
 Our analysis is based on the fact, that despite the revived Armenian – Azerbaijani animosity, 
the centre of power remained intact and was inherited from the Soviet Union to the Russian 
Federation. Hence – in parallel with the rival interests, which try to influence the dynamics of ethnic 
conflict – a third – Russian interest has emerged. Russia – the regional superpower – owns the 
capacity of military, economic and political mechanisms to pursue its interests in pragmatic 
manoeuvres with the three South Caucasus states, and ethnic conflicts represent one of the most 
desired areas for Russian pragmatism to operate.    
I have introduced a slightly provocative line in the article: the famous American Gospel ''Let 
My People Go''. This song describes the story of Hebrew slaves, who seek to gain freedom from their 
Egyptian Masters and find the land to settle and establish their community. The gospel describes the 
events of the August 2008 and 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. It is noteworthy that this phrase has 
been ingrained in African American culture since the second half of the nineteenth century and has 
even become a paraphrase of the liberation of African Americans from slavery, the most famous 
performer of this composition being Louis Armstrong. The rationale behind my decision to use this 
song as a subtitle while discussing the relationship between Russia and Georgia/Russia and Armenia is 
the nature of Russian policy towards the region. If these countries coexisted in the Soviet Union for 
decades, after the Soviet collapse Russia is focusing restrain these countries and ''halt'' any unwanted 
foreign accession. 
 
 Justifying the comparison  
 The Soviet Historiography described the Sovietization of Armenia and Georgia as the 
establishment of Soviet rule by Armenian and Georgian workers with the assistance of the Red Army. In 
this discourse, the annexation of all three countries of the South Caucasus comprises another chapter of 
the Russian Revolution. Throughout the brief period of independence, the hostile Armenian-Azerbaijani 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) and Nakhichevan (1918-1920) was happening. Moreover, the 
Democratic Republic of Georgia led by the Menshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labour 
Party suppressed the uprising in Liakhvi Gorge (Shida Kartli Region). The peasant unrest was supported 
by Bolsheviks, who conceptualized this conflict as a war between Georgian landlords and Ossetian 
peasants.  
 The Soviet rule has decided to quell several ongoing ethnic unrests by introducing the system of 
autonomies. The area, including the Liakhvi Gorge (and the surrounding lands), was incorporated into the 
South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast within Georgian SSR (with the mixed Georgian-Ossetian 
population).  Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was incorporated into Azerbaijan SSR (The area 
with Armenian majority and Azerbaijani minority.) 
           The existence of ethnic tensions before the Sovietization supports the argument of ancient hatreds, 
but the permanent (until the Soviet break-up, during the break-up and after the break-up) peaceful 
coexistence between Georgians and Ossetians outside South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast (in Tbilisi and 
other municipalities of Shida Kartli) and Armenian-Azerbaijani coexistence in Georgia (including Capital 
- Tbilisi and also the region of Kvemo Kartli, where ethnic tensions have never happened) may contradict 
the argument of the continuation of ancient hatreds1.  
 It is legitimate to argue that by setting up autonomies, the Soviet rule had structured the 
manipulative mechanism over South Caucasus republics. For instance: hostilities of the 90s granted the 
inclusion of three republics into the modified Russian influence sphere, the CIS. in the 21st century, 
conflicts had a modified purpose, the obstruction of Westernization and the attempt to halt the possible 
accession to Western supranational alliances of Armenia and Georgia.  
           Eighteen years ago, Georgia declared its choice to become a member of NATO and the EU, while 
Azerbaijan and Armenia do not express this intention. Moreover - Armenia is still a member of the 
Russian-initiated customs union, which was formed as an alternative to the EU’s enlargement in Post-
Soviet Eurasia.  
 The paper considers the pro-Western agenda of Georgia’s post-2003 Rose Revolution 
government as the direct cause of Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia. Plus, the principal reason for the 
Karabakh conflict in 2020 is considered to be the Armenian revolution in 2018. The particular 
provocative factor for Russia - hitherto is Armenia’s occurring democratization and the increasing 
likelihood of the rapprochement with The West. 
  
Let my people go vol.1  
Despite the frozen conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Samachablo), Georgia declared its 
desire to become a member of NATO and the European Union in 2003, in the aftermath of the Rose 
Revolution. This aspiration of Georgia, and the steps it took: the participation of several thousand 
Georgian soldiers in the Iraq war and the diplomatic campaign that was to end with Georgia’s accession 
to NATO at the Bucharest Summit in 2007, were perceived by Russia as the hostile move. It was the 
 
1 ‘’Armenians And Azeris Live In Harmony In Georgian Village’’ 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aqjPSe-Z2d0  
point when the Russian Federation undertook a gradual violation of the declared neutrality in the Abkhaz-
Georgian and Ossetian-Georgian conflicts2.  
Russia has made several manoeuvres before the outbreak of the August War. If we perceive the 
war as a planned annexation of Georgia’s regions by Russia, it will be possible to evaluate these steps as 
part of a well-arranged strategy.    
1) Amid the international recognition of Kosovo, Russia strengthened the discourse of allowing 
the example of Kosovo to be extended to other regions, primarily Abkhazia and South Ossetia  
2) The Bucharest Summit has decided to delay the awarding of Georgia with NATO’s 
membership plan (April 2, 2008). Some experts noted the possible political considerations of NATO's 
European members (Germany and France) to prevent the worsening of relations with Russia as the crucial 
reason.  
3)  April 16th - President Putin orders officials to establish semi-official ties with Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia; April 29 - auxiliary troops are sent to Abkhazia (to counter possible ‘’attack’’ from the 
Georgian side3).  
4) Tensions between Georgians and Ossetians at the beginning of August, 8th August - Russian 
full-scale invasion in Georgia.  
 5) Russia recognizes the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on August, 26th.  
 
Russia ensured the indefinite postponement of Georgia’s integration into NATO and the European Union 
through the transformation of the conflict between Georgia and the breakaway regions in August 2008. 
By deploying its armed forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has created a new status quo that 
gives it a leading role in the conflict, the modus operandi, which significantly reduces Georgia’s 
attractiveness to NATO and the EU.  
           The 2008 war has strengthened the ‘’not letting go’’ policy of Russia towards Georgia in particular 
and the South Caucasus overall.   
 
Let my people go vol.2  
 The view, which describes Russia’s approaches towards Georgia and its separatist regions as the 
policy of balancing the possible NATO expansion in the South Caucasus, is widely discussed  (German 
2012) (Fedorchenko and Krylov 2015). The similar structure of Russian strategy is less discussed in the 
context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Sushnetsov and Neklyudov argue that Russia uses a similar 
 
2 ‘’Putin : Kosovo must become the precedent’’  (in the Georgian language) https://civil.ge/ka/archives/140782  
3 ‘’Timeline : Georgia’s and Russia’s worsening relations’’ https://www.reuters.com/article/us-georgia-ossetia-russia-
idUSLP54772720080826  
balancing strategy towards Armenia and Azerbaijan. The strategy relies on maintaining a military alliance 
with Armenia, supplying Armenia and Azerbaijan with arms. Thus, cooperating with both parties, to 
avoid possible NATO encroachment towards the region (Sushnetsov and Neklyudov 2020).  
 The evaluation of Sushnetsov perfectly sums up the Russian strategy until the Armenian velvet 
revolution in 2018 and the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war in the fall, 2020. However, I believe that 
Russia’s strategy has changed since 2018, which has led to the final admission of the large-scale war in 
Nagorno-Karabakh.  Markedonov and Suchkov discuss certain guarantees of preventing full-scale 
hostilities, which was delivered to Armenia through the Russian mediation of the conflict (Suchkov, 
Markedonov 2020). However, several months after the publication of Suchkovs and Markedonov’s 
article, full-scale hostilities have happened, Armenia losing a large part of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, 
including Shushi the ‘’second capital’’ of the disputed region. 
Something has changed, long-tested and the unshakeable (!?) status-quo was shaken and 
destroyed. Azerbaijani troops have gained a significant advance. The late ceasefire, brokered by Russia, 
returning to the process after weeks of suspicious absence, saved the Armenian-inhabited capital of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Stepanakert from Azerbaijani advance.  
 The reason behind the recent tragic events in Nagorno-Karabakh can be the recent trend of 
revolutionary reforms and institution building in Armenia. Despite pledging the loyalty to the Russian-led 
Customs Union, months after coming to power, Nikol Pashinyan has announced that he was ‘’neither pro-
Russian, nor pro-Western, but pro-Armenian4’’.  
 From the Armenian revolution until the 2020 war, the government sought to attract investments 
from The West. However, the context of Nagorno-Karabakh was limiting the foreign policymaking 
capacities of the new government. The new double-game in the discourse of being pro-Armenian can also 
be understood as the possible source for Russia's irritation. 
 Russia has managed to interrupt the possible outbreaks of conflict in Nagorno Karabakh three 
times (2016, 2018 and the spring of 2020). Eventually, the war has started in the autumn of 2020. The 
Azerbaijan army crossed the almost 30 years old dividing lines and entered the formerly Armenian-held 
territories. Everyone expected Russia to traditionally summon the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, to 
ensure the immediate establishment of peace. However, this did not happen. At the beginning of the 
conflict, Russia was staying out of the process, only after six weeks, Russia managed to establish the 
cease-fire, leaving Azerbaijan with significant gains, including Shushi and the Armenian side with control 
over the capital, Stepanakert. Additionally, Russia gained the right to form a military presence in the 
region, Russian peacekeepers are responsible for a corridor between Armenia and NKR through Lachin. 
 
4 ‘’Why the Armenian Revolution might not succeed’’ http://worldpolicy.org/2018/06/04/why-the-armenian-revolution-might-
not-succeed/  
There is no indication that Russia could not secure immediate peace. However, the deal, which 
was brokered six weeks after the resumption of hostilities, had significantly widened Russia’s control 
over NKR, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus overall. The Russian military is the only security 
guarantor of the remaining Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s economic 
vulnerability and the lost military competition puts the legacy of the Armenian Revolution under 
question.  In the aftermath of the war, Russia had improved its control mechanisms over the country by 
retaining the Armenian population in Stepanakert and surrounding regions. Decisively suppressing any 
intention of collaboration with the West in Armenian elites.  
 
Conclusion  
Russia’s intention of maintaining the existing conflicts and, in the circumstances, of manoeuvring 
through them is partly successful. Russia failed to overcome the pro-Western choice of Georgian society.  
In The South Ossetian conflict, Russia’s tactic was first to refrain from involvement in the 
conflict and then to intervene against Georgia. Since 2008, Russia’s role in the South Ossetian conflict 
has changed from a peacekeeper to an occupier. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has 
successfully maintained a neutral position to this day, immediately after the end of the war, Russia has 
managed to deploy its troops in the region as a peacekeeper.  
However, the South Ossetian war in 2008 has significantly delayed Georgia’s rapid integration 
into the Western supranational institutions. In the case of Armenia, with the sudden collapse of the 
security guarantees of Nagorno-Karabakh, Russia has gained additional control mechanisms over the new 
Armenian government. The deployment of Russian troops in Nagorno-Karabakh significantly aligns 
Armenia’s foreign policy with Russia’s interests.  
To conclude, recent escalations in South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have shown that ethnic 
conflicts are the principal part of Russia’s South Caucasus policy. The 2008 Ossetian-Georgian 
escalation, as well as the 2020 escalation between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, had the purpose of 
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